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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Petitioners' Petition
for Review of non-final administrative orders, when Petitioners,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991) and Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65B, made a showing that absent review of the
orders, Petitioners would be irreparably harmed and had no other
means of redress?
ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A copy of the unpublished Order in the above-encaptioned case,
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 29, 1992, is attached as an
exhibit to this Petition.
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The Order of the Utah Court of Appeals from which Petitioners
seek review is dated May 29, 1992. There has been no request for
rehearing or extension for time to petition for certiorari.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1991) confers jurisdiction upon
the Supreme Court to review this Order:
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)

a judgment of the Court of Appeals

CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Constitution Art. X, Sec. 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1991)
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board
of State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the
state engineer.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991)
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting
all administrative remedies available, except that:

(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative
inadequate; or

remedies

are

(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result
in irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph
(b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving
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other types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph
(d) (involving wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or
paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority)• There shall be no special
form of writ. The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this
rule does not provide special proceedures, proceedings on petitions
for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set
forth elsewhere in these rules.

(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply
with duty.
(1) Who may petition.
A person aggrieved or whose
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this
paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief.
Appropriate relief may be
granted:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act
required by law as a duty of office, trust, or station; or (C)
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right
or office to which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition.
On the filing of a
petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse
parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing
order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the
merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings
are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further
than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its
authority.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Course of Proceedings Below
The five interlocutory orders from which Petitioners brought
t h e n "Jet il in tin IN IUI ni#i ii
n i i entered - • the Division of Occupa(i
tional

and

(A.L.J

Professional

Licensing,

administrative

Steven Ecklund presiding, on Apri

17, 1992

^

Law

Judge

1992 and April
Review Or, In

The Alternative, For Extraordinary Relief ::i n the Utah Court of
Appeal
Petition

1992.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners'

an Order dated May 29, 1 992

Order

that Petitioners bring this Petition for Certiorari.
Statement of the Facts
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational ainJ Professional Licensing of the Utah Department of Commerce (Division)
filed nil Hot ice i i Ai|<ini,.iy Act ion against Petitioners, seeking to
suspend or revoke Petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional
conduct under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 58-7-2(6) (1989).
Among other things, the Di vi si on a] 1 eged

t:1 * ",,|-"1 : tioners had

violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. SS 58-7

i(7) (k) , -(1) ,

•-(q), and -tr\

by, among other things, taking lewd nude photo-

graphs of

a patient,„ i,i id perform i I'ng unnecessary treatments

in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
action. On May * .

* , the Division heard or a] arguments oi lln s,

motion and entered a preliminary order as to the identity of the
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presiding officer.

On April 1, 1992, in oral argument, Petitio-

ners requested a clarification of this order.

On April 7, 1992,

A.L.J. Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order,
which stated that the Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would
act as the presiding officer to determine factual issues and render
a written recommended order, and that the A.L.J, would act as the
presiding officer for legal issues and would assist the Board in
preparing that order.
On June 20, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close the
hearing on the matter to all members of the press and public.
July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memorandum.

On

The Salt

Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion.
On July 2, 1991, the Division granted the Tribune's motion to
intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed its memorandum
in opposition to Petitioners' motion.

On July 9 and 10, 1991,

Petitioners filed replies to the submissions of the Division and
the Tribune.

Oral argument on this motion was heard on April 1,

1992 by A.L.J. Ecklund.

On April 7, 1991, he ordered that Peti-

tioners' motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board,
and that the hearing was governed by the Open and Public Meetings
Act because the Board, rather than the A.L.J., was the presiding
officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied
Petitioners' motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing
be open to the press and public.
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On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to
exclude certain evidence, including:

(1) K.W.'s prior sexual

history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that nature as
to similarly situated witnesses.

Petitioners filed a response to

this motion on July 1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed
a reply memorandum.

A.L.J. Ecklund heard oral argument on this

motion on April 1, 1992.

He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and

other witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation be
excluded from the proceedings on April 17, 1992.
On July 11, 1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of
the standard of proof which should govern a hearing on the merits
of the action.

Petitioners filed a response on June 21, 1991, to

which the Division replied on July 1, 1991.
heard this motion on April 1, 1992.

A.L.J. Ecklund also

Following oral argument, on

April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard of proof for professional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the
evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioners attempted to appeal all of these interlocutory
orders to the Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS
APPEAL PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2) (1991) AND UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991).
This Petition sets forth an issue of first impression in the

State of Utah: Is there any statutory provision for interlocutory
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appellate review of orders of state administrative agencies and,
if there is such provision, did the Court of Appeals err in denying
Respondents7 Petition for Review?
Two Utah statutes define the jurisidiction of the Court of
Appeals over orders of administrative agencies, Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2) (1991) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991).
Section 78-2a-3(2), in relevant part, states:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies • • »
(Emphasis added.)
hjL

The Legislature Has Granted Appellate Jurisdiction Over
Interlocutory Appeals From State Agencies To The Utah Court
Of Appeals.
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is that words

used in statutes should be given their ordinary, plain meaning,
In re R.D.S. . 777 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah 1989), because the plain, ordinary
meaning is the best indication of legislative intent.

Berube v.

Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). As a corollary, unambiguous language in a statute may not be interpreted to
contradict its plain meaning. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500
(Utah 1989); accord gamp y, Qffjgs
242, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

pf Recovery Services, 779 P.2d
Thus, a statute should be read

according to its literal wording "unless it would be unreasonably

7

confusing or inoperable."

Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990).
Further, in interpreting legislation, this Court must assume
that "the legislature advisedly adopted each term of a statute,"
and must, accordingly, "construe statutory provisions to make them
harmonious with the other statutes relevant to the subject matter."
State v. Chindgren, 777 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord
Amax Magnesium Corp., 796 P.2d at 1258; State v. Coando, 784 P.2d
1228, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

This is because "the intent of

the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context
and structure in which it is placed."

Taylor v. Utah State

Training School. 775 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accor-

dingly, this Court must favor a construction "which gives effect
to all of [the statute's] provisions," Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
784 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1989); aSSSEflflcByideyy Carter, 784 P.2d
141, 143 (Utah 1989), so must give "effect to each . . . word,
phrase, clause, and sentence where reasonably possible."

Chris &

Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n of the State of Utah. 791
P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990), Howe. J., dissenting.

This Court "may

not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or delete,
subtract, or omit anything therefrom." Iji. Statutory language may
only be omitted, eliminated, or disregarded as surplusage "when the
words of a statute are • • . meaningless or inconsistent with the
intention of the legislature otherwise plainly expressed in the
statute."

Ifl.

Thus, "[a] court will not construe a particular
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provision of a statute so as to neutralize or modify other provisions if any other construction of the particular provision is at
all tenable."

I£.

Section 78-2a-3(2), accordingly, must be

interpreted by this Court according to its plain, ordinary meaning
and, to the extent reasonably possible, the interpretation must
include the meaning of all words, phrases, clauses, and sentences
in the statute.
The emphasized language in section 78-2a-3(2) unambiguously
indicates that the Court of Appeals has "interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction" over "final orders" and "decrees" of state agencies.
Because "orders" and "decrees" issuing from state agencies are
essentially the same thing, the term "decrees" should be distinguished from the term "final orders," to utilize each term of the
statute.

Because the statute has already provided that the Court

of Appeals has interlocutory jurisdiction, a reasonable interpretation is that "final orders" applies to final agency action and
"decrees" applies to non-final agency action, thereby giving the
Court jurisdiction over both final and non-final administrative
actions.
In contrast, interpreting "final orders and decrees" to mean
"final orders and final decrees" would make the legislature's use
of the term "decrees" redundant and without meaning, in violation
of the canons of statutory interpretation.

If the legislature had

intended to limit the Court's jurisdiction to final orders only,
it presumably would have used the language it has used elsewhere
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for this purpose, "final agency action." See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(l) (1991).

To adopt the position that the Court of

Appeals only has jurisdiction over final agency orders, this Court
would have to disregard the phrase "including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals" in the initial statement, which is applicable by its position to the entire subsection, including subsubsection (a)• This statute, accordingly, should be interpreted
to give the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over both final orders
and interlocutory decrees coming from state agencies.
B.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act Allows Judicial Review
Of Non-Final Agency Actions In Compelling Circumstances.
The Court of Appeals is required, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

S 78-2a-3(4) (1991) to "comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings."
One of these requirements, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1991),
states that "the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings."

This statute sets forth the general

rule that a party may seek judicial review of an agency action only
after exhausting all available administrative remedies.
Comm'n v. Tver son, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989).

See Tax

The steps

required for exhaustion of available administrative remedies are
specified by statute and generally include:

(1) The initial final

determination of the issue by the agency;

(2) an additional

application for review or rehearing; Hi-Country Homeowners Assn.
v. Public Service Comm'n. 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989); and (3)
10

in some cases, additional administrative appeals.

See, e.g..

Heinecke v. Department of Commerce. Div. of Occupational and
Professional Licensing. 810 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(there is no statutory requirement for agency review of an order
of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing comparable to what Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 provides for the Public
Service Commission)•

In the present case, we are concerned only

with the first administrative remedy, the final determination of
the issue by the agency.
There are exceptions to this general rule.

The statutory

justification for these exceptions is set forth in Utah Code Ann.
S 63-46b-14(2) (1991), which provides as follows:
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except
that:
. . .

(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies
would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
Through the plain language of subsection (b), a party may
seek judicial review prior to exhaustion of any or all administrative remedies if the administrative remedies are inadequate or the
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dispropor-
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tionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
Because a party may be relieved of the requirement of exhaustion
with respect to "any or all adminstrative remedies,** and because
a final determination is an administrative remedy, a party may,
under this language, seek judicial review of an interlocutory
administrative order if it comes within either sub-subsection (i)
or sub-subsection (ii).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that such exceptions to
the general rule exist.
the Court stated:

For example, in Iverson. 782 P.2d at 524,

"Exceptions to this rule exist in unusual cir-

cumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some
oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears
that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. ** See also State v.
DuPere, 709 P.2d 493, 497 (Alaska 1985) (**in a proper case a court
may exercise its discretion and provide judicial relief without
requiring the claimant to exhaust his administrative remedies**).
The Court of Appeals has, therefore, been explicitly granted
interlocutory

jurisdiction over appeals, including those from

administrative actions.

Further, the Utah Administrative Proce-

dure Act (UAPA), by which the appellate courts are bound, authorizes interlocutory administrative appeals within the restrictions
set forth by S 63-46b-14(2). Accordingly, if petitioners can show
that their appeal comes within these requirements, this Court
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should determine that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to
hear Petitioners' appeal.
A±.

There Is No Adequate Administrative Remedy For The Wrong
Petitioners Assert.

To come within the requirements of subsection (i), Petitioners must show that "the administrative remedies are inadequate.11
Although the Utah appellate courts, to Petitioners' knowledge,
have not ruled on what constitutes an inadequate remedy, other
jurisdictions have.

As an example, the Arizona Supreme Court

accepted jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory order of
the Industrial Commission to the effect that the petitioner was
not entitled to use a tape recorder during a medical examination.
The court held that, because this was a discovery order and a tape
recording of what was said during the examination would constitute
admissible evidence at any Industrial Commission hearing, the
petitioner did not have an adequate remedy after an award had been
issued, and so came within this exception.

Burton v. Industrial

Comm'n of Arizona, 166 Ariz. 238, 801 P.2d 473, 474-75 (1990); see
also Cussimanio v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 5 Kan. App. 2d
379, 617 P.2d 107, 113 (1980) (••[e]xhaustion of administrative
remedies is a matter within the sound discretion of the courts and
is not required when administrative remedies are inadequate");
accord Tiernan v. Trustees of California State University and
Colleges, 188 Cal. Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317, 320, 33 Cal. 3d 211
(1983); Western Kansas Express, Inc. v. Duaan Truck Line, Inc. 11
Kan. App. 2d 336, 720 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1986); Mattoon v. Citv of
13

Normanf 617 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Okla. 1980). "As a general rule, the
exhaustion requirement is only applicable when there is an available procedure which, if pursued successfully would accomplish the
petitioner's desired result."

Lyke v. Lane County, 70 Or. App.

82, 688 P.2d 411, 413 (1984).
In the present case, there is no statutorily delineated
method of obtaining redress from an interlocutory order within the
Division, or any provision for agency review of even a final
order.

Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 463.

As such, there is no ad-

ministrative procedure which would right the wrong which Petitioners assert.

Further, because many of the issues raised by the

appeal would be moot if a final order were obtained, especially
the issues involving the open hearing procedure and the evidentiary issues, pursuing the actions until a final order is obtained
would not provide an adequate remedy.
Many jurisdictions find that the requirement of exhausting
administrative remedies is inapplicable when all that is involved
in the appeal is statutory interpretation.

For example, the court

in Carter v. Alaska Public Employees Ass'n. 663 P.2d 916, 922 n.
19 (Alaska 1983) stated that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies Mis not applicable where the remedy sought is judicial rather
than administrative," and that

M

[resolution of a question of

statutory interpretation is judicial rather than administrative."
The issues raised in Petitioners' Petition are all matters of
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statutory interpretation, making judicial review even more desirable.
2.

If Forced To Exhaust Administrative Remedies,
Petitioners Will suffer Irreparable Harm,

To come within the requirements of subsection (ii), Petitioners must show that "exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion.11

Continuing the present adjudication

through to a final order would result in irreparable harm to
Petitioners which would be totally out of proportion to the good
anticipated from requiring petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies•
The major harm which will impact Petitioners should this
Petition be denied, thereby forcing Petitioners to continue litigation under the present orders, is the complete, total, and irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations
which will result from an open and public hearing on the merits of
the case. Because of the extremely controversial and inflammatory
nature of the charges made by the Division against Petitioners,
the propensity of key witnesses to make outrageous and inflammatory statements to the press, and the highly prejudicial nature
of the evidence which might be introduced, Petitioners, even if
they were ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would, in
all likelihood, lose their dental practices and personal reputations as a consequence of publicity in this matter.

That any

hearing on the merits will be highly publicized by the press and
15

other media is extremely likely; the Salt Lake Tribune has already intervened in opposition to Petitioners' motion to close the
proceedings, and K.W., one of the more flambouyant witnesses for
the Division, has already appeared on local and national television and made statements about the case.

This relatively small

amount of publicity has already had serious repercussions for
Petitioners.

Should the hearing on the merits of the case become

a Mmedia event,M as would be the logical consequence of the Division's order, the ensuing publicity will only cause irreparable,
uncontainable, and incalculable damage to Petitioners' reputations
and livelihoods.

For this reason alone, judicial review of the

open hearing order is critical to the administration of justice in
this case.
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similarly, needs immediate judicial attention; the Division is only able
to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to
the present proceeding, the basis for its ruling that the hearing
should be open to the press and public, because of its order
making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law Judge, the
trier of fact.

The order identifying the Board as the presiding

officer responsible for factual findings is, therefore, the cause
of the public hearing issue.

If the A.L.J, were the trier of

fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then
the Division, in all probability, could not order an open hearing.
Further, there is a substantial chance that this order, which
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allows the Division to Hswitch,f presiding officers at will during
the course of this single matter, will result in substantial
arbitrariness and prejudice to Petitioners.
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as
a result of the remaining orders, which prejudice could be avoided
if Petitioners were granted interlocutory review.

Central to

Petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for and
history of promiscuity, and evidence of her previous, extensive,
and ongoing behavior pattern of seducing not only other medical
practitioners but many other persons.

As a consequence of the

order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual history, Petitioners ' defense will be substantially impaired.

This problem should

be remedied immediately, being an evidentiary issue which could
become moot after the rendition of a final order because petitioners will not be able, under the order, to even proffer, let alone
prove substantial evidence necessary for their defense, making an
incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order.
Accordingly, if Petitioners are required to exhaust their
administrative remedies by obtaining a final agency order, they
will be irreparably harmed.

Because this irreparable harm will

conceivably destroy Petitioners' personal and professional lives,
regardless of the outcome of this proceeding, it is substantially
greater than any interest the state may have in requiring exhaustion of remedies.

Consequently, this case is an appropriate one

for interlocutory review.
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In summary, Petitioners can not only show one but both of the
circumstances

set forth

in section 63-46b-14(2)(b), that the

available administrative remedies are inadequate, and that exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm.
The Utah Constitution, art. I, sec. 11, states, in part, that
11

[a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done

to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessarily delay • • • • "

Should Petitioners be barred from

their interlocutory appeal, they will be irreparably injured in
their reputations and businesses, and will have no recourse to the
courts to attempt to resolve the problem prior to the occurance of
the injury.

Such denial of judicial recourse is a violation of

Petitioners' constitutional rights.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, granted
by statute, over interlocutory appeals, including interlocutory
appeals from administrative actions, provided that:

(1) There is

no adequate administrative remedy, or (2) the petitioner will be
irreparably harmed out of proportion to the benefit expected from
exhausting administrative

remedies, if forced

to exhaust ad-

ministrative remedies, including obtaining a final administrative
order.

In the present case, there is not only no administrative

remedy, but the pursuit of a final order under the present decrees
would result in incalculable damage to Petitioners' reputations
and livelihoods regardless of the outcome of this proceeding.
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This Court should, therefore, find that the Court of Appeals erred
in denying Petitioners' Petition for Review.
II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PROVISIONS OF RULE
65B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for

relief to be granted under its provisions "where no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy exists."

If this Court should deter-

mine that a Petition for Review is unavailable to Petitioners, it
should, alternatively, find that review by the Court of Appeals of
the orders at issue is permissible under rule 65B.
Under rule 65B, which was enacted in its present form in
1991, relief is available for several categories of injury, including the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.

Utah R. Civ, P. 65(B)(e) (1992).

Under subsection (e)(2),

"[appropriate relief may be granted:

(A) where an inferior

court, administrative

agency, or officer

exercising

judicial

functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion
n
. . . .

Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed
recently, the substantive intent behind the rule and the requirements for its application have not changed over the last several
decades.

The Utah appellate courts have given instruction as to

how this rule is to be applied.

Most instructive are the guide-

lines set forth in Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283
(1956):
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(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction
or is proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction and there
is no adequate remedy, the writ should issue as a matter
of right.
(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without
jurisdiction, but it appears that there is an adequate
remedy, the writ should generally not issue, but the
court is not entirely without discretion.
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it
appears that by an erroneous order it has placed one
party in a position where he will be irreparably injured
and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise
of its sound discretion use the writ as a procedure for
immediate review.
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction
and there is an adequate remedy, the writ should never
issue.
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes.
are guidelines.

Rules (2) and (3)

Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for City of Ocrden. 112 Utah
36, 185 P.2d 256, 261 (1947).
In the present case, Petitioners are appealing from orders of
an administrative agency which are, in their view, abuses of the
agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within subsection (e)
of rule 65B.

This situation also falls within section (3) of the

Anderson guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the
matter

but

the

erroneous

orders

of

the

Division

are

placing

petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured
absent immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy
of any sort available for Petitioners.

That Petitioners will be

irreparably injured has been discussed in detail in the preceeding
20

section.

Accordingly, the Court may use this as a procedure for

intermediate review if Petitioners have no adequate remedy to
prevent irreparable injury.
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law
cannot avail himself of a rule 65B petition. See Crist v. Maoleton
Citv, 28 Utah 2d 7, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) (petitioners did
not avail themselves of readily available remedies at law, so
"placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus11).

Should this Court determine that the Utah Court of

Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory
administrative appeal under the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2) and S
63-46b-14(2), petitioners have no available or adequate remedy.
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no available or
adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B petition is available.

For

example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield
Citv, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action
for extraordinary relief was the appropriate vehicle for obtaining
review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial of a
conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no
statutory provision for review of a city council action. Petitioners, should this Court determine that interlocutory review is
otherwise unavailable, will be similarly

situated with Davis

County; a rule 65B writ should, therefore, be available to Petitioners.
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Accordingly, even if this Court determines that an interlocutory appeal is unavailable under sections 78-2a-3(2) and 6346b-14(2), it should find that the Court of Appeals erred in
denying Petitioners' Petition because Petitioners are entitled to
bring this Petition under rule 65B.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the Order of the
Court of Appeals denying Petitioners' Petition for Review on either
of two alternative theories:

Petitioners are entitled to inter-

locutory review of non-final orders of the Division on the grounds
that

such review

is authorized under the

(1) jurisdictional

provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) and S 63-46b-14(2)# or
(2) procedures for extraordinary relief set forth in rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this Qj^^k

day of June, 1992.

Jacksor^ Howard, J]
Leslie Slaugh, and
Linda J. Barclay, for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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Brent A. Burnett
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Kent Blaine Hansen and
Brent D. Hansen,
ORDER

Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 920291-CA

Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing,
Respondent.

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings

(Law & Motion)

This matter is before the court upon a petition for review
of a non-final administrative order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.

In

light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that respondent's
motion to accept a late filed response is denied.
Dated this .^v^day of May, 1992.

Gregory ^Jfrf

JUN 02 1992
Russell W. Bench, Judge

udith M. Billings, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Jackson Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
Linda J. Barclay
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
Robert E. Steed
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
36 South State Street, 1100 Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 29th day of May, 1992.

Deputy Clerk

BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON PROCEDURES
GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO
CLOSE HEARING
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the
hearing in the above-entitled matter to all members of the press
and public.

On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum

opposing that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a petition
tc intervene with respect to the mccion.

By Order, dated July 2,

1991, the Court granted that petition and the Intervener's
memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was filed on July
3, 1991.

Respondents filed replies to the submissions by the

Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 and July 10, 1991,
respectively.
Oral argument on the motion was conducted on April 1, 1992
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists

Board.

Aside from the merits of the motion, the narrow issue

initially presented was the manner in which the motion should be
addressed.

Specifically, the issue is whether the motion is one

properly before the administrative law judge or the Board.

At

the conclusion of argument in that regard, the Court entered an
order, the terms of which are restated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
Respondents assert parties to a formal adjudicative
proceeding have a statutory right to be present at any hearing,
but urge the press and the public have no such right.
Respondents thus contend the presiding officer may take
appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing and
may thus exclude the press and public in an appropriate case.
Respondents further assert the presiding officer in this
proceeding is the administrative law judge. Since the Open and
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et seq.,
hereinafter, the Act) only applies to meetings convened by a
public body which consists of two or more persons, Respondents
urge it is the administrative law judge - as the presiding
officer - who is authorized to determine whether the subsequent
hearing in this proceeding should be closed.
The Division and the Intervenor jointly contend the Act
applies to the hearing to be conducted in this proceeding, any
decision to close the hearing is thus governed by the Act and
that determination is to be made by the public body before whom
the hearing will be held.
The Act generally governs meetings convened by a public
2

body, as those terms are defined in Sections 52-4-2(1) and (2),
respectively.

Sections 52-4-2(1) defines "meeting" as:

. . . the convening of a public body, with
a quorum present, whether in person or by
means of electronic equipment, for the
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter
over which the public body has jurisdiction
or advisory power....
Section 52-4-2(2) defines "public body" as:
. . . any administrative, advisory,
executive or legislative body of the state or
its political subdivisions which consists of
two or more persons that expends, disburses,
or is supported in whole or in part by tax
revenue and is vested with the authority to
make decisions regarding the publics
business . . . .
On April 11, 1977, an opinion was issued (#77-94) by James
L. Barker of the Office of the Utah Attorney General to Ronald E.
Casper, then Director of the Department of Registration, now
known as the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
The just-stated opinion was in response to various questions
concerning the scope of the Act with regard to meetings conducted
by boards and committees established pursuant to Section 53-1-1
et seq.

The opinion set forth the conclusion that such boards

and committees are "public bodies" with the meaning of Section
52-4-2 and that quasi-judicial hearings "to determine findings
and recommendations for disciplinary action" are subject to the
Act.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-l et
seq., hereinafter, the UAPA) does not expressly provide that
hearings conducted in formal adjudicative proceedings are subject
to the requirements of Section 52-4-1 et seq.
3

Section 63-46b-8

generally sets forth hearing procedures applicable in formal
adjudicative proceedings.

Subsection (1)(i) of that statute

merely provides all hearings "shall be open to all parties".
However, Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory
Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of the UAPA (Code
Co. at 14) provide as follows:
Non-parties may also be afforded the
opportunity to observe hearings. See e.g.,
Section 52-4-1 et seq. (Open and Public
Meetings Act).
Given the foregoing, the Court concludes the Act applies to
hearings conducted in professional disciplinary licensure
proceedings initiated by the Division if the presiding officer at
the hearing is a "public body" within the meaning of Section 524-2(2).

The Court also notes Section 13-1-11, which authorizes

the Department to employ administrative law judges "to conduct
hearings for the department".

If an administrative law judge is

the presiding officer duly authorized to conduct a hearing and
subsequently enter an order pursuant to Section 13-1-12(1) (a) ,
the Act would not apply because an administrative law judge is
not a "public body" within the meaning of the Act.
Section 63-46b-8(2) of the UAPA expressly provides that
nothing in that section precludes the administrative law judge as the presiding officer - "from taking appropriate measures
necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing".

Further,

R151-46b-10(B) of the rules of procedure which govern
departmental adjudicative proceedings provides:
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Unless ordered by the department for good
cause, if a hearing is conducted, it shall be
open to the public.
Pursuant to the just-quoted rule, an administrative law judge as the presiding officer authorized to conduct a hearing - could
determine to close the hearing for good cause (e.g., an in camera
proceeding could be conducted, as was done at the conclusion of
Respondents7 April 1, 1992 voir dire examination of the Board).
Such a determination would not be governed by the Act.
However, it is the Board which is duly authorized to act as
the presiding officer in the subsequent hearing in this
proceeding with respect to the entry of findings of fact,
conclusions of law and any recommended order regarding
Respondents' licenses.

Thus, the hearing to be held is governed

by the Act and the decision whether to close the hearing is a
matter properly addressed to the Board.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to close
the hearing to be conducted before the Board is a matter governed
by the Act. The Board - as the presiding officer authorized to
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended
order subsequent to any such hearing - shall address Respondents'
motion and determine whether the hearing should be closed,
consistent with the provisions of the Act.
Dated this

'T&0~

a a y 0 f April, 1992
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON RESPONDENTS7
MOTION TO CLOSE HEARING
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune
BY THE BOARD:
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the
hearing in this proceeding to all members of the press and
public.

On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum in

opposition to that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a
petition to intervene with respect to the motion.

By Order,

dated July 2, 1991, the Court granted that petition and the
Intervener's memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was
filed on July 3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the
submissions by the Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991
and July 10, 1991, respectively.
Oral argument on Respondents' motion was conducted on April
1, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists

Board.

Members of the Board present were Mark L. Christensen,

Paul R. Lunt, Elizabeth A. Reinerth, Max A. Blackham, Floyd R.
Tanner, and Roger E. Grua. The remaining Board member, William
E. Dunn, was also present, but Mr. Dunn had been recused from any
participation as a Board member in this proceeding and did not
participate with respect to the pending motion.
After the conclusion of oral argument, the Board deliberated
the matter.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 52-4-1 et seq.,

the Board subsequently entered an order, the terms of which are
restated as follows:
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondents' motion to close the
hearing to be conducted before the Board is denied.
Specifically, Dr. Lunt, Ms. Reinerth, Dr. Blackham, and Dr.
Tanner vote to conduct a hearing in this proceeding which shall
be open to the press and public. Dr. Christensen and Dr. Grua
would close the hearing.
Dated this _ 2 E _ T d a y of April, 1992
FOR THE BOARD

BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant
to an August 17, 1989 Notice of Agency Action-

The notice, which

was signed by David E. Robinson as the Director of the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, recited a hearing
would be conducted on October 4, 1989 and indicated the presiding
Qffi^o>- £•£ t*is hearincr would be J. Steven E3ciund

Administrative

Law Judge for the Department of Commerce.
On April 30, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss.
Oral argument was conducted with respect to that motion on May
23, 1991. Prior to conclusion of that argument, counsel for
Respondents made inquiry regarding the procedures which would
govern any subsequent hearing conducted to address whether a
disciplinary sanction would enter as to Respondents' licenses.
The Court informed counsel for Respondents as to the respective

roles of both the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board and the
Administrative Law Judge in that process.
Respondents now seek further clarification, urging the
presiding officer in this proceeding should be the Administrative
Law Judge, as initially indicated in the August 17, 1989 notice.
Respondents assert the Administrative Law Judge should enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law and then submit any
recommendation to the Board for its review.

On April 1, 1992,

oral argument was presented as to the just-referenced matter and
the Administrative Law Judge entered an order, the terms of which
are restated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert this proceeding should be conducted in a
manner consistent with that set forth in the August 17, 1989
notice.

Specifically, Respondents urge no basis exists to

designate various presiding officers to act in different
capacities during the course of this proceeding.

The Division

contends the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the
UAPA) provides such flexibility and does not require the same
individual or body of individuals to act as the presiding officer
for all purposes throughout an adjudicative proceeding.
The UAPA clearly provides that different individuals or
entities may act as the presiding officer with regard to a given
phase of a proceeding.

For example, Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)

provides the notice of agency action shall be signed by "a
presiding officer". Mr. Robinson thus acted as the presiding
officer for that purpose when the August 17, 1989 notice of
2

agency action was issued.

Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(x) also

requires the notice of agency action to identify the "name,
title, mailing address and telephone number" of the presiding
officer.

The confusion in this case has been prompted by the

August 17, 1989 notice, which failed to specifically and
adequately inform Respondents as to the respective role of the
Board and the Administrative Law Judge in this proceeding.

In

that regard, it is necessary to review the UAPA, the legislative
history of Section 13-1-12 and Section 58-1-16 and the nature of
agency practice pursuant to those statutes.
The UAPA, which became effective January 1, 1988, generally
applies to all state agencies.

Section 63-46b-2(h) defines

"presiding officer" as:
. . . an agency head, or an individual or
body of individuals designated by the agency
head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to
conduct an adjudicative proceeding.
Section 63-46b-2(h) further provides:
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not
compromised, an agency may substitute one
presiding officer for another during any
proceeding;
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding
i.i-l^SIT
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continue as the presiding officer during all
phases of the proceeding.
The just-quoted statutes provide some guidance and limitations
regarding who can serve as presiding officers.

See Comments of

Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the Drafting and
Interpretation of the UAPA (Code Co. at 11).

Section 63-46b-

2(h)(ii) and (iii) jointly operate to provide that different
individuals or entities may act as the presiding officer with
3

respect to a given phase of a proceeding and, significantly, it
is not necessary any given presiding officer during an earlier
stage of a proceeding continue as the presiding officer
throughout the latter stages of the proceeding.
Section 13-1-8.5(1) provides the Department of Commerce and
its various divisions shall comply with the UAPA in their
adjudicative proceedings.

Section 13-1-1 provides the Department

may employ administrative law judges to conduct hearings before
the Department.

Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12

stated:
(1) The administrative law judge or an
occupational board or representative
committee, with assistance from the
administrative law judge, shall render a
written recommendation of administrative
action, supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law . . .
Section 13-1-12 now provides:
(1)(a) At the close of an adjudicative
proceeding, the administrative law judge or
an occupational board or representative
committee with assistance from the
administrative law judge, shall issue an
order.
Section 58-1-1 et seq. both establishs and generally governs
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.

Section

58-1-16(1)(a) expressly provides the Division shall comply with
the UAPA in all disciplinary licensure proceedings. Prior to
January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 stated as follows:
(1)(a) Before suspending, revoking, or
refusing to renew a license, and before
issuing a cease and desist order, the divison
shall notify the licensee or license
applicant of the action by letter deposited
in the post office with postage prepaid
4

addressed to the last address of the licensee
or license applicant known to the division,
that the action is being considered and that
the division will provide the licensee or
license applicant with a formal hearing
before an appropriate hearing officer or
board, as designated bv the director.
Section 58-1-16(2) further stated:
All hearings provided under this section
shall be held before an appropriate hearing
officer or board, as designated bv the
director, pursuant to Chapter 1, Title 13.
The board or hearing officer shall render a
written recommendation supported by the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made
at the hearing together with a recommendation
for action. The director, with the
concurrence of the appropriate board, may
issue a written order based on the
recommendations but is not bound to follow
the recommendations of the administrative law
judge or the hearing officer. The written
order of the director shall include the
rationale and justification for the decision.
If the director does not issue an order
within 10 days after the administrative law
judge or the hearing officer has made the
recommendations, the recommendations shall be
binding on the parties to the administrative
action.
Section 58-1-16 was amended, effective January 1, 1988.
statute now provides:
(a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be
held before an a^oro^riate ^residing officer
as designated by the director;
(b) The presiding officer shall make
written recommendations for action, findings
of fact/ and conclusions of law;
(c) The director, with the concurrence of
the appropriate board, may issue a written
order based on the recommendations but is not
bound to follow the recommendations of the
presiding officer;
(d) If the director does not issue an
order within ten days after the presiding
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That

officer has made the recommendations, the
recommendations of the presiding officer
shall become the order.
Section 58-7-2(6) specifically governs possible entry of a
disciplinary sanction with respect to an individual licensed to
practice dentistry.

That statute provides:

The division, upon recommendation of the
board, may suspend or revoke the license of a
dentist or dental hygienist for
unprofessional conduct and may reinstate such
license.
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 provided for a
hearing before "an appropriate hearing officer or board" and
recognized that either the board or the hearing officer was
authorized to render a written recommendation.

Subsequent

amendments to Section 58-1-16 now generally provide that
adjudicative proceedings amy be held before "an appropriate
presiding officer".

The statute, as amended, reflects no

legislative intent that the presiding officer could not be either
an appropriate hearing officer or the board.
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12 authorized either
an administrative law judge, or an occupational board or
representative committee with assistance from the administrative
law judge, to issue findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
recommendation for action. Although that statute was
subsequently amended, it still authorizes either the
administrative law judge, or the board or committee with
assistance from the administrative law judge, to issue a order at
the close of an adjudicative proceeding (i.e. after the
conclusion of a hearing).
6

The Court takes notice of the fact that the Division's
practice has been to to designate an administrative law judge as
presiding officer for the purposes of ruling on questions of law
and procedure and to also designate the appropriate board of the
specific licensed profession to enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a recommendation.

Such has consistently

been the prevailing agency practice, both prior to and after the
1988 amendments to Section 58-1-16 and Section 13-1-12•

It

appears that practice has been employed to utilize the respective
expertise of an administrative law judge, consistent with the
provisions of Section 13-1-11, as well as the recognized
expertise of the various boards set forth in Title 58.
To the extent the term "presiding officer" - used in Section
58-1-16 - is ambiguous, a reasonable administrative
interpretation and practice should be given some weight.

Salt

Lake City v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 568 P.2d 738 (1977); Cannon
v. Gardner, Utah, 611 P.2d 1207 (1980).

Given the reasonable

administrative interpretation of - and practice under - the
statutes in question, the Court concludes the instant
adjudicative proceeding may properly be conducted in a similar
manner and the August 17, 1989 notice failed to accurately
identify that procedure.
Thus, supplemental notice is now provided that the Board
will act as the presiding officer in this proceeding to thus
render a written recommended order, supported by the findings of
fact and conclusions of law.

Consistent with Section 13-1-

12(1)(a), further notice is now provided the administrative law
7

judge will assist the Board in preparing that order for its
issuance. Consistent with Section 13-1-11 and the long standing
practice in professional disciplinary licensure hearings, notice
is further provided the administrative law judge will rule on
questions of law and procedure which may arise, both prior to and
during the hearing.
One further matter should be addressed.

The Court notes

Respondents previously filed a June 20, 1991 motion to recuse
David E. Robinson from participating in this proceeding.
Further, the Division has filed a March 10, 1992 notice, whereby
Mr. Robinson has recused himself in that regard.

Pursuant to

Section 58-1-16, Mr. Robinson could have been otherwise
authorized to act as the presiding officer as to any findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order entered by the
Board.
This Court's March 19, 1992 Scheduling Order indicated oral
argument could be presented as to whether any recommended order
submittted by the Board may properly be subject to review and
subsequent action by David L. Buhler, Executive Director of the
Department of Commerce.

The UAPA is silenr as to both any

procedure which governs possible recusal of a presiding officer
and the consequences of any such recusal. However, Section 13-112(2) provides as follows:
If a division director is unable for any
reason to fairly review or rule upon an order
of the administrative law judge or a board or
committee, the executive director shall
review and rule upon the order.
Given the language of the just-quoted statute, it would appear
8

David L. Buhler is thus authorized to rule on any findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order subsequently
entered by the Board in this proceeding.

The Court will contact

respective counsel on April 13, 1992 to identify whether
Respondents anticipate filing any motion to recuse Mr. Buhler
from participation in this proceeding.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Dentists and Dental
Hygienists Board shall act as the presiding officer in this
proceeding to render a written recommended order, supported by
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Further, the

administrative law judge will assist the Board in preparing that
order for its issuance and the administrative law judge shall
rule on all questions of law and procedure which may arise during
the pendency of this proceeding.
It is further ordered that any motion to recuse David L.
Buhler from participation in this proceeding shall be filed
within ten (10) days after the Court has conducted a conference
call with respective counsel to determine whether any such motion
is anticipated.
Dated this

rf®^00*

day of April, 1992
J.USteven (Eklund
Administrative Law Judge
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
ORDER ON DIVISION'S
MOTION- IN LIMINE
::
::
:
:

CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
By motion, dated June 14, 1991, the Division seeks to
exclude certain evidence in the hearing to be conducted before
the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board in the above-entitled
matter.

Specifically, the Division urges: (1) evidence

concerning K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation
should be excluded; and (2) evidence of that nature as to other
witnesses similarly situated should also be excluded.
Respondents filed a response to the just-described motion on
July 1, 1991 and the Division's reply was filed July 2, 1991.
Oral argument was conducted April 1, 1992 before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce,
and the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court, now being fully advised in the premises, enters
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
The Division contends none of the above-referenced evidence
is relevant as to whether Respondents engaged in unprofessional
conduct, as alleged in the August 17, 1989 Petition.

The

Division further asserts the evidence should be excluded because
its probative value - if any - is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence would confuse the
issues and "drag out details of K.W.'s private life for no
legitimate reason or purpose".
Respondents note Count I of the petition, which contains an
allegation they took "sexual liberties" with certain patients.
Respondents urge that allegation places the sexual activity of
the supposed victims at issue, the Board must determine whether
the actions allegedly taken were "liberties" or "invited
responses" and evidence of the supposed victim's consent is thus
relevant.
Respondents also contend K.W.'s past sexual conduct
demonstrates her propensity to brazenly pursue sexual relations,
the conduct which allegedly occurred between her and Respondents
was prompted by her aggressive suggestion and the alleged conduct
thus reflects an isolated incident not indicative of any public
threat.

Respondents thus assert evidence of K.W.'s consenting

participation is a relevant mitigating factor to be considered by
the Board as to any disciplinary sanction which may be warranted
in this proceeding.
Section 63-46b-8 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(hereinafter, the UAPA) provides:
2

(1) . . . in all formal adjudicative
proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as
follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall
regulate the course of the hearing
to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to avoid all the
parties reasonable opportunity to
present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon
objection by a party, the presiding
officer:
(i) may exclude
evidence that is
irrelevant, immaterial,
or unduly repetitous . .
• •

Comments of the Utah Administative Law Advisory Committee on the
drafting and interpretation of the UAPA reflect as follows:
The intent of the Advisory Committee was
that the grant of authority to the presiding
officer found in Section 63-46b-8(1)(a)
should be broadly construed. (Code Co. 1988
at 13-14) .
The above-quoted statute does not expressly make the Utah Rules
of Evidence applicable in formal adjudicative proceedings.
However, Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(i) allows a presiding officer to
exclude irrelevant evidence.

Instructively, Rule 401 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as:
. . . evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Rule 403 generally provides that relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury

..."

The evidence which is the subject of this pending motion

3

specifically involves Rule 404, which states:
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(3) Evidence of the character of
a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608 and 609.
Rule 608 governs evidence offered concerning the character and
conduct of a witness as follows:
(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, other than
conviction of a crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
During oral argument on the pending motion, Respondents
asserted K.W.'s credibility (or that of any other witness) may be
assailed by evidence of the prior sexual history or reputation of
that witness.
reasons.

Such assertion is without merit for numerous

First, Rule 608 expressly precludes extrinsic evidence

of that nature for such a purpose.

Further, prior sexual history

of a witness is not probative of the veracity of the witness.

In

State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court stated as follows:
Because the law does not and should not
recognize any connection between the veracity
of a witness and her sexual promiscuity, the
4

proposed evidence has no relevancy in regard
to the truthfulness of her testimony . . ..
Such evidence, if offered to attack the credibility of a witness,
should be particularly excluded because "its primary purpose and
effect" would be to "cast aspersions" on the witness and
"besmirch her character" in the eyes of the Board.

See Bullock

v. Unoricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975).
The remaining issue is whether the evidence in question is
admissible regarding K.W.'s possible consent (or that of any
other patient) to the alleged conduct of either of the
Respondents.

In State v. Johns, supra, the Court stated:

. . . in cases involving forcible rape or
aggravated sexual assault, the fact a woman
has consented to sexual activity in the past
under different circumstances and with
individuals other than the defendant has
little if any relevancy to the question of
her consent and the situation involved here.
However, . . . there are some cases in
which the reputation of the prosecutrix and
in which specific prior sexual activity may
become relevant and its probative value
outweighs the detrimental impact of its
introduction. Id. at 1263-64.
The Court thus set forth the following test:
While the balancing of the probative value
of the evidence and its detrimental effect is
entrusted to the discretion of the trial
judge, in the usual case such evidence,
either of general reputation or specific
prior acts, is simply not relevant to any
issue in the rape prosecution including the
consent of the prosecutrix. Such evidence is
admissible only when the court finds under
the circumstances of the particular case such
evidence is relevant to a material factual
dispute and its probative value outweighs the
inherent danger of unfair prejudice to the
prosecutrix, confusion of issues, unwarranted
invasion of the complaintant's privacy,
consideration of undue delay and time waste,
5

and the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. Id at 1264. (Emphasis added.)
Although this is not a criminal proceeding, the just-stated
principles are persuasive and should also be applied in this
case.
Evidence of consensual participation by a patient with
respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly undertaken by either
of the Respondents has significant probative value as to both the
circumstances which may have prompted whatever occurred between
Respondents and a given patient and the nature of any
disciplinary sanction which should enter if unprofessional
conduct is found to have occurred.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

recognized the vital function of cross-examination in
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. D.B. v. Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147
(1989).

Respondents may thus cross-examine any given patient

concerning the specific circumstances of this case and the
possible existence of the above-referenced mitigating factor.
Further, evidence of a patient's prior consensual sexual
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the
context of a physician/patient relationship has some probative
value, insofar as it relates to the issue of consensual
participation of that patient in this case. Within the juststated constraints, Respondents may cross-examine such a witness
in this proceeding as to that matter.
However, any evidence of a witness' general prior sexual
history or reputation should be excluded for various reasons.
6

The right to cross-examine a witness "does not entail the right
to harrass, annoy or humiliate [a] witness on cross-examination".
State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), quoting Evans
v. Alaska, 550 P.2d 830, 837 (Alaska 1976).

Character evidence

of prior sexual behavior is often of "slight probative value, is
very prejudicial and may confuse the issues at trial". State v.
Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988).

As that Court further

stated:
One of the trial judge's duties is to
regulate the admission of character evidence
so as to exclude evidence which tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main
question of what actually happened on a
particular occasion. This process prevents
the trier of fact from rewarding one
individual and punishing another because of
their respective characters, instead of
focusing upon the evidence in the case. Id.
Given the foregoing, the Court necessarily concludes any
evidence of a witness7 prior sexual history or reputation beyond the limited scope of cross-examination identified herein would unduly subject either K.W. or another witness similarly
situated to humiliation and constitute an unwarranted invasion of
their privacy.

The degree of unfair prejudice which would result

is thus clear.
Importantly, such evidence would also tend to confuse the
issues and mislead the Board by shifting what should be the
predominant focus of this proceeding (i.e., the nature of
whatever conduct occurred between Respondents and K.W. or other
patients) to the myriad relationships which existed or conduct
which occurred regarding any given patient and a third party.
7

Further, if any extrinsic evidence of that nature were allowed,
it would also require the Board to assess the credibility of the
various witnesses who testify regarding those relationships.
Such would be particularly indirect and potentially fruitless
process with respect to the Board's primary charge, which is to
determine the nature of Respondents' conduct with respect to K.W.
or other patients.
Respondents urge the Board is more capable than a common
jury of assessing the evidence sought to be admitted and such
evidence should thus be allowed, even though of minimal probative
value, because a lesser risk of undue prejudice exists in this
administrative setting.

The Court is not persuaded Rule 403 is

any less applicable in this adjudicative proceeding than it would
be in a criminal or civil action.

Simply put, the initial and

continuing focus of this proceeding should be directed toward
whatever conduct was undertaken by either Respondent with respect
to those individuals referenced in the petition, the
circumstances which prompted whatever may have occurred, whether
any basis exists to impose a disciplinary sanction as to either
Respondent and the nature of any sanction which is warranted.
Given the disposition of the pending motion, Respondents
will thus be allowed to present and support their theory of the
case, subject to restrictions which are necessary to ensure the
evidence received in this proceeding is admitted within the
proper scope of those issues to be addressed by the Board.
ORDER
Evidence of consensual participation by K.W. or another
8

patient with respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly
undertaken by either of the Respondents is admissible in this
proceeding.

Respondents may thus cross-examine those witnesses

concerning those circumstances in an attempt to establish the
existence of such a mitigating factor.
Further, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' prior sexual
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the
context of a physician/patient relationship shall be also
admissible, both on cross-examination of that witness and for
possible impeachment purposes on rebuttal.
However, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' general
prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded for the
reasons set forth herein.
Dated this

day of April, 1992

a
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Steven /Eklund
d n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge

BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND
BRENT D. HANSEN
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
::
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ORDER ON APPLICABLE
STANDARD OF PROOF
CASE NO. OPL-89-47

Appearances:
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant
to an August 17, 1989 notice of agency action.

Sparing detail,

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, 1991 and oral
argument was conducted on May 23, 1991. Prior to the conclusion
of oral argument, counsel for Respondents made inquiry regarding
the standard of proof which would govern any subsequent hearing
conducted to address whether a disciplinary sanction should enter
as to Respondents' licenses.
The Court thus requested both parties to submit memoranda as
to that matter.

The Division filed its brief on June 11, 1991,

Respondents filed their memorandum on June 21, 1991 and the
Division's final reply was filed July 1, 1991. Oral argument was
subsequently conducted April 1, 1992 and the Court took the
matter under advisement.

The Administrative Law Judge, now being fully advised in the
premises, enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend the applicable standard of proof in
this proceeding should be clear and convincing evidence•
Specifically, Respondents urge this proceeding is quasi-criminal
in nature and that the Division seeks to impose a punitive
sanction which would impinge on their constitutionally protected
rights.

Respondents also assert Utah courts have required clear

and convincing proof in a civil contempt case and such a case is
"strikingly similar" to this professional licensure disciplinary
proceeding•

Given both the nature of this proceeding and

Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their ability to
practice their chosen profession, they contend the Division
should be required to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Division asserts Utah courts adhere to the general rule
that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a
preponderance of the evidence.

The Division notes there is no

statutorily established standard of proof which governs the
instant proceeding and many other courts in other states have
utilized the preponderance standard in professional licensure
disciplinary proceedings.
In Rogers v. Division of Real Estate. 790 P.2d 102 (Utah
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals described a professional
licensure disciplinary proceeding as:
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. . . a special, somewhat unique, statutory
proceeding, in which the disciplinary board
investigates the conduct of a member of the
profession to determine if disciplinary
action is appropriate to maintain sound
professional standards of conduct and protect
the public. Id. at 105-06.
The Utah Court of Appeals has also recognized that a person
"whose freedom to pursue his profession is seriously restricted
by an official action . . . may compel the government to afford
him a hearing complying with the traditional requirements of due
process".

D.B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional

Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Endler
v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal.2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 304 (1968).
No statute exists which establishes the standard of proof
applicable in this proceeding.

The Utah Administrative

Procedures Act (Sections 63-46b-l et seq., hereinafter, the
UAPA), those statutes governing the Department of Commerce
(Sections 13-1-1 et seq.) and the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing (Sections 58-1-1 et seq.) are all silent
in that regard, although Section 63-46b-l6(4)(g) of the UAPA
provides the standard on judicial review as "substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court".
Further, Utah courts have not specifically addressed the
appropriate standard of proof in professional licensure
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division.

Thus, the

issue presented should be resolved based on a review of analogous
cases decided by the courts of this state and the more persuasive
decisions rendered by courts in other states.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that driver license
3

revocation proceedings are not necessarily "criminal" or "quasicriminal" in nature, Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division,
595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979).

In Ward v. Smith. 573 P.2d 781

(Utah 1978), the Court held a parole revocation hearing was an
administrative, rather than a criminal, proceeding.

Id, at 782,

See also Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah L986) ; Walker v.
Board of Pardons, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
In further contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes,
the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that a driver license
revocation proceeding "requires proof only by a preponderance of
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt".
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1982).

Garcia v.

The preponderance

standard also applies in a parole revocation proceeding.

Johns

v. Shulsen, supra, at 1338; Walker v. Board of Pardons, supra.
Respondents contend their respective interests in the
continuation of their livelihood are deserving of more protection
than that afforded a motorist merely faced with the loss of
driving privileges or a parolee who might lose their conditional
freedom.

Even assuming Respondents are correct, many courts in

sister states have applied the preponderance standard of proof in
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings.

Rucker v.

Michigan Board of Medicine, 138 Mich. App. 209, 360 N.W.2d 154,
155 (1984);

In re Schultz. 375 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. App.

1985); Forster v. Board, 103 N.W. 776, 714 P.2d 580, 582 (1986);
Eaves v. Board of Medical Examiners, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa
1991).
Other courts have utilized a clear and convincing evidence
4

test. Ettinaer v. Board of 1-iedical Quality Assurance. 185
Cal.Rptr. 601, 603 (1982); In re Zar. 434 N.W.2d 598f 602 (S.D.
1989) . In Hoaan v. Mississippi Board of Nursingr 457 So.2d 931
(Miss. 1984), the Court characterized a license revocation
proceeding as "penal" in nature and thus required proof by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. at 934. The South Dakota Supreme
Court has emphasized a higher standard of proof should apply in
such a proceeding due to the interest involved (i.e., a
professional's career), stating:
The revocation of a license of a
professional [person] carries with it dire
consequences. It not only involves
necessarily disgrace and humiliation, but it
means the end of [his or her] professional
career.
In re Zar, supra.
However, a professional licensure disciplinary hearing is
not a criminal proceeding in nature.

See Rogers v. Division of

Real Estate, supra, and cases cited herein.

Concededly,

Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their
professional livelihood and the possible deprivation of that
ability as a result of this proceeding are substantial.
Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (1982).

In re

Nevertheless, this

Court seriously questions Respondents7 implicit suggestion that a
license to practice dentistry represents a fundamental
constitutional right.

The New Jersey Court squarely rejected a

similar contention in the case of In re Polk, supra,
instructively stating as follows:
A license to practice a profession is not a
basic individual right. While it embraces a
5

substantial individual interest which
deserves abundant protection, it cannot be
equated with a fundamental right, the
reasonable regulation of which can be
measured and justified only by a compelling
state interest. The right to practice
medicine itself is granted in the interest of
the public and is "always subject to
reasonable regulation in the public
interest." Id. at 17 (Citation omitted).
In its persuasive and well reasoned decision, the Court further
recognized the government's "paramount obligation to protect the
general health of the public" and the right of physicians to
practice their profession as being "necessarily subordinate to
this governmental interest". Id at 14. Significantly, the Court
concluded:
We are satisfied that the preponderance of
the evidence burden of proof is sufficient
for purposes of an administrative
adjudication concerning professional guilt
and discipline against a licensed medical
doctor. In view of the subject matter of
such proceedings, the nature of the evidence,
the qualifications of witnesses, the special
expertise of the tribunal, the relative
advantages and resources of the parties, and
the minimal risk of inaccurate or erroneous
factfinding and final decisionmaking,
confidence in a final adjudication would not
be imperiled by employing the preponderance
of the evidence standard. These proceedings
do not demand an enhanced burden of proof.
Id. at 16. (All emphasis herein added).
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently addressed the standard
of proof applicable in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

In

the early case of In re Hanson. 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778 (1916),
the Court commented that evidence in such a proceeding "should be
clear and convincing" and such a rule "is based upon a most solid
foundation". Id at 779. The Court later recognized the
6

applicable test as being a "clear preponderance of the evidence".
In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 305 (1933).
In a subsequent case, the Court stated that charges in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding "should be clearly sustained by
convincing proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence".
re McCullouah. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939).

In

More recently,

the Court has stated as follows:
We agree that because of the seriousness of
the consequences to the attorney involved
touching upon the important right to follow
his vocation and make a livelihood, that such
is the established rule (i.e., the persuasion
of his misconduct must be by clear and
convincing evidence).
In re MacFarlane. 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (1960).

The

somewhat misleading phrase "clear preponderance", as used by the
Court in the case of In re Barclay, supra, has been defined by
the Washington Supreme Court as follows:
"Clear preponderance" is an intermediate
standard of proof in these cases, requiring
greater certainty than "simple preponderance"
but not to the extent required under "beyond
reasonable doubt". This intermediate
standard reflects the unique character of
disciplinary proceedings. The standard of
proof is higher than the simple preponderance
normally required in civil actions because
the stigma associated with disciplinary
action is generally greater than that
associated with most tort and contract cases.
Yet because the interests in protecting the
public, maintaining confidence, and
preserving the integrity of the legal
profession also weigh heavily in these
proceedings, the standard of proof is
somewhat lower than the beyond reasonable
doubt standard required in criminal
prosecutions.
In re Allotta, 109 Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628, 630-31 (1988).
7

Respondents thus suggest the enhanced standard of proof in
attorney disciplinary proceedings should also be applicable in
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the
Division-

Since the underlying purpose of disciplining both

attorneys and physicians is protection of the public, one court
has recognized the same enhanced standard should apply to a
practitioner of either profession.

Ettinaer v. Board of Medical

Quality Assurance, supra.
However, the New Jersey Surpeme Court has acknowledged a
"less stringent burden of proof" can be rationally applied in
medical licensure proceedings "as more protective of society7s
important interest in individual life and health". In re Polk,
supra, at 18. Further, the Iowa Supreme Court has upheld
dissimilar standards of proof as between those professions "where
the regulations being compared have been established by differing
branches of government". Eaves v. Board of Medical Quality
Examiners, supra.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the same issue and
applied the preponderance standard of proof in a dental licensure
disciplinary proceeding, stating:
We note the burden of proof in attorney
disciplinary cases is clear and convincing
evidence. Attorney disciplinary proceedings,
under the supervision and control of the
judiciary, are sui generis. Attorney
misconduct, striking as it does, at the
administration of our justice system, gives
society a heightened interest in the outcome
of attorney discipline. A higher standard of
proof is indicated. (All citations omitted).
In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1989).
8

The Court nevertheless

recognized the nature of the proceeding and appropriately
provided the following caution:
. . . these proceedings brought on behalf
of the state, attacking a person's
professional and personal reputation and
character and seeking to impose disciplinary
sanctions, are no ordinary proceedings. We
trust that in all professional disciplinary
matters, the finder of fact, bearing in mind
the gravity of the decision to be made, will
be persuaded only by evidence with heft. The
reputation of a profession and the reputation
of a professional as well as the public trust
are at stake. Id.
Respondents cite other cases decided by the courts of this
state where a clear and convincing standard of proof was applied.
Wvcoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d
283 (1962); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
However, neither of those cases involved a disciplinary sanction
with respect to a professional license.

Since those cases are

distinctly different in nature from this proceeding, the
principles set forth therein provide no meaningful guidance for
purposes of the matter now under review.

Further, this tribunal

has previously concluded the standard of proof which should apply
in professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by
the Division is a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Barney

(Case No. OPL-91-69, filed August 2, 1991).
Based on the foregoing, a considered review of existing case
law and the arguments presented by both parties, this Court is
not persuaded the standard of proof previously applied in
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the
Division should be abandoned.

The Court further concludes the
9

clear and convincing standard of proof applied in attorney
disciplinary proceedings in this state should not be extended as
to govern this proceeding.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the standard of proof in this
professional licensure disciplinary proceeding shall be a
preponderance of the evidence.
Dated this

l*J ^

day of April, 1992

J.Wsteven^[Eklund
Administrative Law Judge
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENT BLAINE HANSEN and BRENT D.
HANSEN,

PETTnON FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

Petitioners,
Case No. OPL-89-47

vs.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,
Respondent.

Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen, hereby petition the Utah Court of Appeals
to permit an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Honorable J. Steven Ecklund entered
in this matter on the following dates:
1.

Order on Procedures Governing Disposition of Respondents' Motion To Close

Hearing, dated April 7, 1992.
2.

Order on Respondents' Motion to Close Hearing, dated April 7, 1992.

3.

Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order, dated April 7, 1992.

4.

Order on Division's Motion in Limine, dated April 17, 1992.

5.

Order on Applicable Standard of Proof, dated April 17, 1992.

A copy of the orders sought to be reviewed are attached, as is a brief memorandum
explaining the jurisdictional basis for this petition for review.

PERSONS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED
Petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen are the only persons substantially
affected by these orders of the Division, although such orders, to the extent that they represent
ongoing and established procedures of the Division, may affect all persons against whom actions
are brought by the Division.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah filed a Notice of Agency Action against
petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen. The Notice of Agency Action sought to
suspend or revoke petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional conduct under the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-2(6). Among other things, the Notice alleged that petitioners had
violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-1.l(7)(k), (1), (q) and (r) by, among other
things, the taking of lewd nude photographs of K.W., a patient, and performing unnecessary
treatments in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors. The Notice also indicated that
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the presiding officer would be J, Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department
of Commerce.
On April 30, 1991 respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. On May 23,
1991, the Division heard oral arguments on this motion. As a result, it made a preliminary
order as to the identity of the presiding officer.

On April 1, 1992, in oral argument,

respondents requested a clarification of the identity of the presiding officer. On April 7, 1992,
Judge Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order which stated that the
Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would act as the presiding officer in the hearing to
determine factual issues and rendering a written recommended order, and that the administrative
law judge would act as the presiding officer regarding legal issues and would assist the Board
in preparing that order.
On June 20, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to close the hearing on the matter to all
members of the press and public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memorandum. The Salt Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion. On July 2, 1991,
the Division granted the Tribune's motion to intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed
its memorandum in opposition to petitioners' motion. On July 9 and 10, 1991, petitioners
filed replies to the submissions of the Division and the Tribune. Oral argument on this motion
was heard on April 1, 1992 by Judge Ecklund. On April 7, 1991, he ordered that petitioners'
motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board and that the hearing was governed
by the Open and Public Meetings Act because the Board, rather than the Administrative Law
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Judge was the presiding officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
recommended order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied petitioners'
motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public.
On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to exclude certain evidence,
including: (1) K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that
nature as to similarly situated witnesses. Petitioners filed a response to this motion on July
1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed a reply memorandum. Judge Ecklund heard
oral argument on this motion on April 1, 1992. He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and other
witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded from the proceeding on
April 17, 1992.
On June 11,1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of the standard of proof which
should govern a hearing on the merits of the action. Petitioners filed a response on June 21,
1991, to which the Division replied on July 1, 1991. Judge Ecklund also heard this motion on
April 1, 1992. Following the oral argument, on April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard
of proof for professional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing
evidence.
Petitioners bring this Petition to appeal from all of these orders.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
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1.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the Board would act as

presiding officer for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law and, at the
same time in the same proceeding, that the Administrative Law Judge would be the presiding
officer for purposes of ruling on questions of law and procedure?
2.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in denying petitioners' motion to close

the hearing and in ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public?
3.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that petitioners' motion to

close the proceedings to the public and press was governed by the Open and Public Meetings
Act because the finder of fact in the present action was the Board rather than the Administrative
Law Judge?
4.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the evidence of K.W. 's

and other witnesses' general prior sexual history be excluded from the proceeding?
5.

Did the Administrative Law Judge err in determining that the standard of proof

for professional licensing proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence?
Petitioners seek, for relief, the resolution of these issues.
ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE AGENCY
The factual recitation above indicates that each of these issues was briefed and argued
before the Division of Professional Licensing, and that the Administrative Law Judge considered

5

each of these issues and issued separate orders on them. Copies of each of these orders are
attached to this Petition.
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY
Immediate appeal from these orders is necessary because petitioners will be irreparably
harmed if they are forced to continue litigating this matter under these orders in order to obtain
a final judgment. The major harm which will, in all probability, ensue should this petition be
denied and petitioners be forced to continue litigation under the present orders is the complete,
total and irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations resulting from an
open and public hearing on the merits of the case. Because of the extremely controversial and
inflammatory nature of the charges made by the Division against petitioners and the highly
prejudicial nature of the evidence which might be introduced, petitioners, even if they were
ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would likely lose their dental practices and personal
reputations as a consequence of extensive publicity in this matter. That any hearing on the
merits will be highly publicized by the press and other media is extremely likely. The Salt
Lake Tribune has already intervened in opposition to petitioners' motion to close the
proceedings. K.W., one of the more controversial witnesses for the Division, has already
appeared on local and national television and made statements about the case, which has already
had serious repercussions for petitioners. Should this matter become a "media event," the
ensuing trouble and loss of reputation for petitioners will be uncontainable and incalculable.
For this reason, an interlocutory appeal on this order is critical to the administration of justice.
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Petitioners should not be tried and convicted in the media, as they will almost assuredly be, but
the issue should be adjudicated within the non-public confines of the appropriate, legislatively
established tribunal.
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similarly, needs immediate attention;
the Division is only able to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to the
present proceeding because of its order making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law
Judge, the trier of fact. The order identifying the presiding officer responsible for factual
findings as the Board is, therefore, the "cause" of the closure problem. If the Administrative
Law Judge were the trier of fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then
the issue of closure of the hearing would possibly not exist. Further, there is substantial chance
that this order, which allows the Division to "switch" presiding officers at will during the
course of this single matter, in contravention of the intent of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act and other related statutes, will result in substantial arbitrariness and prejudice to petitioners.
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as a result of the remaining
two orders, which prejudice could be avoided should this Court grant their Petition for Review.
Central to petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for sexual immorality in
general, and her previous, extensive, and ongoing pattern of behavior in seducing other medical
practitioners by means of offering sexual favors in return for controlled substances. As a
consequence of the Administrative Law Judge's Order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior
sexual history, petitioners' defense will be substantially impaired. This problem should be
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remedied immediately, not after rendition of a final order, because petitioners will not be able,
under the present order, to even proffer, let alone prove substantial evidence necessary for their
defense, making an incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF IJTIGATTON
Resolution of all four of these issues on an interlocutory appeal will materially advance
the termination of the litigation because all four of them, if not resolved, now, will need to be
resolved on an appeal if a final order adverse to petitioners is issued. The likelihood of such
an adverse result is greatly increased by the exclusion of evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual
history, which will deprive petitioners of a substantial and important defense, and the order
determining that the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence rather
than clear and convincing evidence. Should an adverse final order issue, petitioners would
appeal these very issues and this Court would consider the appeal. Should this Court find an
abuse of discretion on even one of these orders, the matter would have to be heard again at a
substantial waste of time and expense to all parties concerned, with the additional danger that
memories would have faded and evidence lost. In the context of the present litigation, it would
be in the clear interest of efficiency as well as fairness to grant petitioners' Petition for Review
of these interlocutory orders.
JURISDICnONAL BASIS
The present Petition for Review arises from four non-final administrative orders. This
petition is, accordingly, brought under two alternative theories of jurisdiction:
8

(1) an

interlocutory appeal under rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991), and (2) an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Interlocutory Appeal
Under the new Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and the applicable rules
promulgated by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, M[a] party aggreived
may obtain judicial review of final agency action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l).
Although the UAPA provides substantial rules for review of final administrative orders, see
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1991), 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1991), and 63-46b-14
(1991), there appears to be absolutely no provision for an interlocutory appeal from an
administrative order, except under following language from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)
(1991):
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting
all administrative remedies available, except that:

(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
Under this language, a party need not exhaust any or all administrative remedies, including
obtaining a final order, in order to seek judicial review of the proceeding if the administrative
remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit received from exhaustion.
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Administrative remedies are inadequate in the present case because irreparable harm
will be done to the professional and personal reputations of petitioners, regardless of the
outcome of this proceeding, should the hearings be open to the press and public. Petitioners
will also be damaged by the three other orders, as discussed above, unless afforded immediate
relief. There is no provision in the UAPA or elsewhere that serves to remedy any of these
problems. Consequently, the available administrative remedies are inadequate. The damage
that would be done to the individual petitioners' reputations and ability to defend themselves
from the Division's charges should they not be afforded immediate relief would be devastating
to them, effectively putting them out of business regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
matter. This is, surely, "irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion."
Accordingly, this Petition for Review is brought under the applicable provisions of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, including rule 14, which allows for judicial review by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals "of an order or decision of an administrative agency,
board, commission, committee, or officer." This language does not require that an order
appealed from be a final order; because section 63-46b-14(2)(b) allows an interlocutory appeal
under the present circumstances, this Petition should be granted.
Further, this Petition is brought within 30 days of the date of the first order appealed
from, and supplies the information required in Rule 14. Because this petition is in the nature
of an interlocutory appeal, petitioners, in an effort to assist the Court, have followed the
11

format of a rule 5 petition even though rule 5 is inapplicable to administrative orders under
rule 18.
Extraordinary writ.
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for relief to be granted under
its provisions "where no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists." If this Court
should determine that a Petition for Review under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, this
Court should grant review of the orders at issue under rule 65B.
Under this rule, which was enacted in its present form in 1991, relief is available for
several categories of injury, including the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public
authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (1992). Under subsection (e), "[appropriate relief may be
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion . . . ."
Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed recently, the substantive
intent behind the rule, and the requirements for its application, have not changed over the last
several decades. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have given instruction as to how this rule governing extraordinary writs is to be applied. Most instructive are
the guidelines set forth in Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956):
(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction or is proceeding in
excess of its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy, the writ should
issue as a matter of right.
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(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it
appears that there is an adequate remedy, the writ should generally not issue,
but the court is not entirely without discretion.
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it appears that by an
erroneous order it has placed one party in a position where he will be
irreparably injured and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise of its sound discretion
use the writ as a procedure for intermediate review.
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and there is an
adequate remedy, the writ should never issue.
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes. Rules (2) and (3) are guides.
Id. at 285-86, (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for
Citv of Qgden. 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256, 261)).
In the present case, petitioners are appealing from orders of an administrative agency
which are, in their view, abuses of the agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within
subsection (e) of the rule.

This situation also falls within section (3) of the Anderson

guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the matter but the erroneous orders of the
Division are placing petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured absent
immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy of any sort available for
petitioners. Consequently, this Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, use an
extraordinary writ as a procedure for the intermediate review of the present orders.
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law cannot avail himself of
a rule 65B petition. For example, the plaintiff, in Crist v. Mapleton Citv. 28 Utah 207, 497
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P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972), did not avail himself of readily available remedies at law, so
"placed himself out of the reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus." Likewise, the
Anderson court ruled that H[a]n extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and
cannot be used as such." Anderson. 296 P.2d at 285. Should this tribunal determine that an
appeal under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, there is no other available remedy and
petitioners should be entitled to review of the orders under rule 65B.
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B
petition is available. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield
City. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action for extraordinary relief was the
appropriate vehicle for obtaining review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial
of a conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no statutory provision for
review of a city council action. Id. at 707. Petitioners, should this Court determine that a rule
14 petition is unavailable, will be similarly situated with Davis County; a rule 65B writ should,
therefore, be available to petitioners.
In the present case, it is impractical and inappropriate to file this petition for a writ in
the Division because there is no procedural provision for filing such a writ before the Division
and a request to to the Division to reverse the order will likely be an exercise in futility.
MEMORANDUM ON THE MERITS
A petition for review brought under rule 14 does not require a memorandum on the
merits of the case to be filed at the time the Petition is filed; briefing occurs pursuant to rules
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18, 24, and other applicable rules of the Utah appellate courts subsequent to the filing of the
Petition. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a Petition for
Extraordinary Writ be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support of
the Petition. Petitioner has not filed such a memorandum concurrently with this Petition for
two reasons: First, petitioner has brought this Petition, in the first alternative, as a rule 14
Petition; should this Court determine that rule 14 relief is unavailable to petitioners then
petitioners will promptly submit a rule 19 memorandum. Second, to adequately brief the merits
of the issues, petitioners must have access to the transcript of the relevant proceedings before
the Division. No transcript has yet been prepared, but, under the procedures outlined in rules
15 and 16 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would become available. Should this
Court grant review on either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of this Court in obtaining
the record of the proceedings from the Division, including the relevant transcripts. Petitioners
also seek leave of the court in either granting them the opportunity to fully brief the merits of
the issues pursuant to rules 18, 24, and all other applicable rules or, in the alternative, granting
them an extension of time in which to file a rule 19 memorandum of points and authorities on
the merits of the issues.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition for Review under the
provisions of rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b12(2)(b). Should this Court determine that a Petition for Review is not available to petitioners
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under these rules, petitioners request that this Court grant review through rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Should this Court grant review under either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of
the Court in obtaining the record of the proceedings, including the relevant transcripts, from
the Division, and permission to brief the merits of the issues in full upon receipt of the
transcripts.
DATED this "7~H^

day of May, 1992.

JACKSON HOWARD, /
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and
LINDA J. BARCLAY, for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioners
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